Last may I was in Beijing for a delegation on foreign affairs. Upon arriving we were given a briefing by the program we were traveling with which explained, among other important trip-related necessities, the nature of the Chinese government. We learned that the Chinese were governed by an autocratic single-party system that had had a history of being oppressive; we learned that beginning in 1978, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China opened up their markets, and for the first time in decades, China engaged in wide scale trade with the global market, and the citizenry were able to freely start businesses, search for new jobs, and move and live where they pleased; we learned that the opening of the economy had lead recently to massive economic growth: “For three decades the economy has grown at an average annual rate of nearly 10 percent, and more people have been lifted out of poverty than in any other country, at any other time” (Hessler, 2008). Soon my fellow students and I became aware of a certain contradiction; how could an authoritarian regime wield such political preponderance while at the same time allow free market exchanges? With such growth and innovation, wouldn’t a middle class rise up and demand political freedom? After all, wasn’t that how it happened in Europe?
That night I returned to my room brimming with curiosity because another question began to manifest in my mind as well; with the pervasiveness of global media coupled with the burgeoning Chinese middle class, how could the authoritarian regime possibly keep the flood gates clamped shut, damming up the often ornery and invasive concepts of basic human rights, liberty, and public dissent? As I had unpacked my bags, I noticed a computer sitting on a desk in my room. I sat down at the keyboard and connected to the net with a mission in mind to poke around, and see what the Chinese people could have access to on the internet. On Google I typed in such queries as “human rights,” “freedom in Tibet,” “freedom of the Press,” and “two-party system.” In doing so, I learned how scrupulous the government’s firewall could be. Most all of the pages I attempted to click would say, “This page cannot be displayed.” After a time I went to Google News and clicked on a story regarding Tibet that had been added four minutes ago, and to my delight, the page opened up. I quickly scanned through the article and realized that I was definitely reading something the Chinese government would not want their citizens to read. I had circumvented the firewall! However, suddenly something terrifying occurred. The screen went black and flashed some Chinese characters in red, and with a loud popping sound, the monitor shut off.
Though it seems plausible that the Chinese government has bitten off more than it can chew — that allowing such economic freedom and opening its heretofore isolated populace to the outside world will irrevocably cause the great wall of insularity and repression to come tumbling down — my personal anecdote does well to illuminate the challenges that political change and reform will face. In assessing the different implements that are necessary for democracy to rear itself, there are several circumstances that suggest technological connectedness, media influence, and free market economy—though important stepping stones—may not be sufficient to bring about the necessary reform.
When China opened up to free markets and global trade there was a general expectation that this would lead to political reform. “The argument, in its simplest form, runs like this: economic growth produces an educated and entrepreneurial middle class that, sooner or later, begins to demand control over its own fate. Eventually even repressive governments are forced to give in” (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2005). However, evidence points to the fact that autocratic governments do not sit idly by and allow political change to occur. In fact, the ones achieving the most success in maintaining their heavy-handed control always take a very active role in suppressing and vanquishing any fledgling intimations of dissent. To illuminate how an incumbent government stays ahead of the competition, Bueno de Mesquita and Downs describe a term called “strategic coordination.” “Strategic coordination refers to the set of activities that people must engage in to win political power in a given situation. Such activities include disseminating information, recruiting and organizing opposition members, choosing leaders, and developing a viable strategy to increase the group’s power and to influence policy” (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2005). It seems that the internet would be the perfect medium for an opposition party organize such measures of strategic coordination. However, a closer look reveals that autocratic governments exercise mighty power in curbing these efforts. A plethora of examples exist, but to name a few: “China has periodically blocked access to Google’s English language news service and recently forced Microsoft to block the use of words such as ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ on the Microsoft software used by bloggers” (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2005). Additionally it is notable that China has created a special internet police unit and limited the number of internet gateways into China. (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2005). In order for a democracy to formulate, it is apparent that any opposition party must be allowed to coordinate. With the government keeping such a close eye on what is available on the internet, it seems unlikely that this will happen anytime soon. In a study conducted by Jason P Abbott, a search was conducted in which common progressive keywords were entered into Yahoo. The same keywords were entered in the Asian version of Yahoo as well as the general version of Yahoo. The findings shed some light on the Asian filters: “Civil Rights revealed 11 sites at Yahoo! Asia and 1270 at Yahoo.com; Press Freedom revealed 1 site at Yahoo! Asia and 37 at Yahoo.com; Women’s rights revealed 22 at Yahoo! Asia and 177 at Yahoo.com” (Abbott, 2001). The list of progressive terms is vastly more extensive, and in each instance, Yahoo! Asia revealed significantly less sites. Though, this study was imperfect it shows just how tightly filtered the Asian net can be.
Another factor that has obstructed the internet’s being used as a coattail medium for democracy is the “fear factor.” “Indeed one should not underestimate the use of fear of arrest and imprisonment as a means of enforcement” (Abott, 2005). When the computer screen shut down in my hotel room in Beijing, a veritable fear came over me. Two of my friends in the room even left for fear that a Chinese version of the Gestapo was going to come breaking down the door. “Correspondent Lorien Holland commented, ‘there are a number of surveillance groups checking out the Internet, but none seem to have been particularly effective… [however] most sites that operate inside China (ie chat sites and discussion forums) police themselves so that they stay out of trouble’” (Abbott, 2005).
While it may be hard to believe that fear and heavy-handed control of such access necessities as portals and search engines can allow the Chinese Communist Party to rule without fear of reform, other factors have contributed in bolstering the governments ability to stymie dissent on the net. “Questions must be raised about how effective the internet can be as a vehicle for political transformation when it is clear that across Asia as a whole only a small minority have access to it” (Abbott, 2005). The degree of poverty in China is one that many Americans and Westerners would find hard to fathom. For this reason, the internet appears to be accessed predominantly by very elitist groups — groups that aren’t necessarily disenfranchised by the rule of the communist party. With the current economic growth many people are in fact happy with the government, and as such, have no reason to put themselves at risk expressing political dissent.
While all of this may be the case, it is hard to say that the internet will not have some sort of liberalizing effect on Chinese civil society. “The incipient yet dynamic character of Chinese civil society is evident at various levels. There has been an emerging rights consciousness related to the notion of citizenship rights” (Yang, 2003). A strong civil society is often seen as the basis for a democracy, and as Chinese civil society is said to be in its fledgling levels it appears to be dynamic and open to change. “The relative ‘young’ age of Chinese civil society may thus meant that it is more responsive to technological change, especially those technologies that may meet its needs.” Furthermore, “Studies of Chinese mass media have consistently revealed a tendency toward the loosening of political control and the parallel trend of commercialization” (Yang, 2003). This correlation between the liberalizing of civil society and the pervasiveness of a liberalized mass media seem to be hard to avoid. Yang further argues that social organizations have been burgeoning and have made gains in independence despite strong governmental control. All of these signs seem to point towards the gradual build up toward democracy. However, it is important to realize that the internet is not likely to spark any rapid upheaval. “The internet will probably not bring ‘revolutionary’ political change to China, but instead will be a key pillar of China’s slower, evolutionary path toward increased pluralization and possibly even nascent democratization” (Yang, 2003).
With a sprawling population of over 1.3 billion people and a fast track toward economic prosperity, it seems evident that political reform will come to China. The seeds seem to have already been sown. However, it is important to note that open economic markets and the advent of such seemingly invasive media as the internet are not likely to cause rapid change. The Chinese Communist Party has in the past proven to be malleable, and they have adroitly taken measures to ensure any efforts of reform remain innocuous. Though a more educated middle class is undoubtedly coming through the ranks, the Party still has great influence in shaping their rise. Many look at the children in China today, and see a greater individuality, a break with traditional Chinese values, and predict that they will someday demand a say in how they are governed. However, “Raised and educated within the system, they are just as likely to accommodate themselves to it, as they have done all along” (Chang, 2008).
Literature Cited
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Downs, George W., “Development and Democracy” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5 (Sep. – Oct., 2005), pp. 77-86; Council on Foreign Relations http://www.jstor.org/stable/20031707
Yang, Guobin, “The Co-Evolution of the Internet and Civil Society in China” Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 3 (May – Jun., 2003), pp. 405-422; University of California Press http://www.jstor.org/stable/3557845
Abbott, Jason P., “Democracy@Internet.Asia? The Challenges to Emancipatory Potential of the Net: Lessons fro China and Malaysia” Third World Quarterly Vol. 22, No. 1 (Feb., 2001), pp. 99-114; Taylor & Francis, Ltd.http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993348
Hessler, Peter, “China’s Journey; The Great Nation is on the Move” National Geographic Magazine, Vol. 213 No. 5 (May 2008), pp. 34 National Geographic Society.
Chang, Leslie T. “Gilded Age, Gilded Cage; A New Middle Class Means Aspiration—and Anxiety” National Geographic Magazine, Vol. 213 No. 5 (May 2008), pp. 78 National Geographic Society.